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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN C. SITTNER 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs, 
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE OF 
THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER FAMILY 
TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA, SHIRLYNN 
GILDEA, AND JOY HALE. 
Defendant/Appellees 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER 
AND JOY HALE 
Case No. 971759-CA 
(Priority No. 15) 
Appeal from Summary Judgment of Dismissal and 
Award of Attorneys Fees in Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Judge Homer Wilkinson, Presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
Appellees object to Appellant's characterizations made as a 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE and offer the following for clarification. 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
In February of 1981 appellee/defendant Joy Hale sold a house 
and lot under a title retaining contract to appellees/defendants 
Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea. The referenced property has since been 
the residence of the GiIdeas. [Contract, Rec. 1109-1111] 
On November 25, 1985 plaintiff/appellant John C. Sittner 
obtained judgment against Bruce Gildea and others, (not including 
appellee Shirlynn Gildea) in the amount of $30,598.35 plus 
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attorney's fees of $3,250.00 and interest at the rate of 20% per 
annum. Attorney L. Benson Mabey acted as Mr. Sittner!s attorney. 
See, Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Civil No. C-82-4804, 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. [Judgment, Rec. 
1112,1113] 
Sittner and Mabey sought to attach and sell Bruce GiIdea's 
vendee interest in the residence to satisfy their judgment. On 
January 16, 1986 Bruce Gildea, filed for protection under Chapter 
11 of the bankruptcy code voiding Sittnerfs execution efforts. On 
August 31, 1987 the Chapter 11 filing was converted to a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy. 
Appellant Sittner and attorney Mabey filed a Proof of Claim 
with the United States Bankruptcy Court as unsecured creditors 
citing the Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil judgment. [Proof of 
Claim, Rec. 1114]. 
The Sittner judgment fell within the 90 day preferential 
transfer period proscribed in 11 U.S.C. § 547. Bankruptcy 
Trustee, Duane H. Gillman, filed an Adversarial Complaint, under 
Section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, to avoid Sittnerfs judgment 
lien. [Adversarial Complaint, Rec. 1115-1118] 
The adversarial action was resolved by stipulation wherein 
appellant Sittner agreed to the following terms: 
"1. The Defendant, John C. Sittner, waives any right to 
assert a secured claim in and to any property of this 
estate or any funds which constitute proceeds of property 
of this estate and acknowledges that any and all claim he 
has is an unsecured, pre-petition claim. Defendant's 
rights respecting property abandoned by the estate or not 
- 2 -
administered by closing are preserved and unaffected hereby." 
[Stipulation, Rec. 1119,1120] 
Sittner and his attorney, L. Benson Mabey, thereupon secured 
payment of $4,032.99 as their share of distribution to unsecured 
creditors on their claim of $36,228.73 against Bruce Gildea. 
[Payment check, Rec. 1121]. 
On December 14, 1987, Judge Allen entered a DISCHARGE OF 
DEBTOR Order absolving Bruce Gildea of all of his debt. [Discharge 
of Debtor, Rec. 1122]. 
On February 19, 1988, Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen issued 
an order vacating the Automatic Stay as to vendor Joy Hale and the 
subject residence leaving Mrs. Hale free to foreclose or otherwise 
dispose of the property. The subject real estate contract was 
seriously in default and amortizing negatively and there was no 
equity in the property. [Order Vacating Stay, Rec. 1113] 
Although free of the Automatic Stay in February of 1988, 
Sittner brought no adversary proceeding seeking to value the 
subject real estate contract. At no time did he challenge Mrs. 
Hale's title nor assert a judgement lien interest in the property 
while the matter was in the Bankruptcy Court. 
In August of 1992, appellee Joy Hale sold her interest in the 
subject Uniform Real Estate Contract to appellee Karen H. Schriever 
for the unpaid balance of the contract as discounted for cash. 
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B. Trial Court Proceedings & Disposition. 
Upon learning of Schriever's purchase of the property, Sittner 
and Mabey filed this action against, Schriever, Hale, and the 
GiIdeas. The Complaint alleges that since Schriever is "related by 
blood or marriage to either Bruce Gildea or Shirlynn Gildea" the 
conveyance of the property to the Karen H. Schriever Family Trust 
"was for the benefit of the GiIdeas" and the conveyance from Hale 
to Schriever "constituted fraudulent transfers or arrangements 
under the "Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
26-6-1 et seq." 
Sittnerfs complaint further alleged that the Warranty Deed 
from Hale to Schriever was issued "with actual intent to hinder, 
delay or defeat" the judgment lien claimed by appellant Sittner and 
asked the trial court to "impress" the subject realty with a 
judgment lien "as a valid and subsisting first lien against a one-
half undivided interest in the subject property" and to have the 
subject property sold at execution sale to satisfy Sittner!s 
Judgment." [Complaint, Rec. 6,7,8] 
By affidavit, Sittner asserted the "judgment lien" had an 
"unpaid balance" of $90,197.40 with interest accruing at the rate 
of 20% per annum. [Sittner Affidavit, Rec. 130-134]. Nowhere in 
the pleadings did Sittner acknowledge that his judgment had been 
fully discharged in Bruce Gildea1s bankruptcy action. 
Appellees Schriever answered Sittner!s complaint asserting in 
part that "Plaintifffs Complaint is without merit and in bad faith" 
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and included a prayer for relief of dismissal and attorney's fees. 
[Answer, Rec. 37]. 
In March of 1994, appellee Karen H. Schriever moved for 
Summary Judgment asserting: (1) Sittnerfs judgment against Gildea 
had been satisfied and the lien avoided in Bruce Gildea1s 
bankruptcy; (2) Appellant failed to state a cause of action under 
the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Statute; and (3) the eight (8) year 
statutory period for foreclosing a judgment lien expired November 
24, 1993 eight years after entry of the judgment. Plaintiff filed 
a counter Motion For Summary Judgment. 
On May 18, 1994 the trial court entered judgment dismissing 
the action. However, on September 7th, 1994 the court vacated its 
order of dismissal reinstating Plaintiff's Complaint. The Court 
found that Appellant's judgment lien had somehow survived Bruce 
Gildea1s bankruptcy action. The Court specifically declined to 
rule on other issues including Sittner's failure to state a cause 
of action under the Fraudulent Transfer Statute and whether the 
judgment lien had expired eight years after the date of judgment as 
provided in Utah Code Ann. 78-22-1. 
On March 10, 1995 Sittner resumed prosecution of this action 
by filing a "Motion For Partial Summary Judgment to Permit 
Execution Proceedings to be Completed." [Rec. 469-470]. 
On March 24, 1995 appellee Schriever filed her second Motion 
For Summary Judgment alleging substantially the same defenses 
asserted in her first Motion. [Rec. 510]. 
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Appellee Bruce Gildea petitioned the bankruptcy court and on 
May 8, 1995, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen granted his motion 
to reopen GiIdea's 1986 bankruptcy. On June 13, 1995, Judge Allen 
entered an Order which states in part: 
Debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy was discharged December 14, 
1987, and that discharge enjoined all creditors and other 
parties from attempting to collect any debt that has been 
discharged. The action of John C. Sittner of suing in 
state court was a violation of the injunction, which is 
still in effect, and sanctions are appropriate against 
both John C. Sittner and his counsel L. Benson Mabey, for 
violation of the continuing injunction, in the amount of 
Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00), jointly and 
severally. [Order, Rec. 1096,1097, Addendum 4] 
On October 10, 1995, Sittner and Mabey obtained an order from 
Judge Wilkinson, staying further proceedings in this action pending 
the outcome of Sittnerfs and Mabey's appeal of Judge Allen's Order 
to the U.S. District Court for the State of Utah. On July 16, 
1996, U.S. District Judge Tena Campbell ruled the Third District 
Court is competent to make a ruling on the dischargeability issue 
and reversed Judge Allen's order reopening Mr. GiIdea's bankruptcy. 
Judge Tena Campbell's ruling includes the following specific 
finding: 
!,The court finds that the bankruptcy court's evaluation 
of the status of Sittner's judgment lien is correct in 
all respects. It seems clear that the judgment lien was 
waived in the course of bankruptcy proceedings, and the 
debt secured by that lien was fully discharged in 
bankruptcy". [Order, Rec. 1106, Addendum 5]. 
On October 23, 1996, more than eight years and eight months 
after the Automatic Stay had been lifted by the bankruptcy court 
allowing Mrs. Hale to sell or foreclose her security interest in 
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the subject property Sittner resumed efforts to foreclose his 
claimed judgment lien by filing a Motion For An Order Compelling 
Discovery. He asked the trial court to allow him to take the 
depositions of appellees Hale (then on an LDS Mission) and 
Schriever (a resident of Maryland) by telephone. [Rec. 946]. 
Thereafter, on January 14, 1997 appellee Schriever filed her 
Third Motion For Summary Judgment. [Rec. 1061]. 
On March 25, 1997, Judge Wilkinson granted Schriever's Third 
Motion For Summary Judgment dismissing appellant Sittner's 
complaint with prejudice and awarding all appellee/defendants 
costs and attorneys fees pursuant to Utah Code annotated 78-27-56. 
[Rec. 1257, Copy, Addendum 1], 
The trial court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
detailing basis for its conclusion that "Plaintiff's claims are 
without merit and not asserted in good faith". [Rec. 1250-1255, 
Copy, Addendum 2]. 
Neither the Judgment nor the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law were contested by Appellant. No motion was filed pursuant 
to Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), 54(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Appellees/defendants submitted itemized statements of 
attorneys fees incurred in defending this action. Appellant 
objected to the fees and the matter was set for hearing on June 11, 
1997. The trial court asked the parties to try to reach an 
agreement without further litigation, expense and delay. The 
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parties compromised their claims and entered into the record the 
terms of a stipulation wherein appellee Karen H. Schriever was to 
be awarded $17,500.00; appellees Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea were to 
be awarded $16,000,00; and appellee Joy Hale was to be awarded 
$3,750.00. [Transcript of Proceedings, Rec. 1496-1499]. 
On June 27, 1997 the trial court entered a "Supplemental 
Judgment for Award of Attorney's Fees" awarding appellee Schriever 
$17,500.00; appellees Gildea $16,000.00; and appellee Hale 
$3,750.00 pursuant to stipulation of all parties. [Supplemental 
Judgment, Rec. 1400-1401] 
On July 25, 1997, Appellant sought relief from the 
Supplemental Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) and (7), Utah R. 
Civ. P. [Rec. 1412-1413]. 
On September 29, 1997, the trial court entered an 
Order pursuant to Appellant's Rule 60(b)(3) and (7) motion stating: 
"...the supplemental judgment for attorney's fees signed 
and entered June 27, 1997 is vacated pending further 
consideration by the Court of Plaintiff's motion to 
vacate the stipulation, et. al, but reserving the right 
to re-instate the supplemental judgment as previously 
signed and entered, should the Court determine after 
further consideration that Plaintiff's motion is not well 
taken and should be denied." [Order, Rec. 1533-1535]. 
On October 21, 1997 the trial court entered a second 
Supplemental Judgment Awarding Attorney's fees. The judgment was 
prepared by Appellant's counsel and restated the terms of the 
previous judgment. [Supplemental Judgment Awarding Attorney's 
Fees, Rec. 1541-1542]. 
No motion was filed pursuant to Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), 
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54(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
C. Appellate Proceedings and Disposition. 
On November 14, 1997, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of 
the "final judgment" entered October 21, 1997. 
On July 9, 1998 this Court granted appellee Schriever?s motion 
for summary disposition dismissing Appellant's appeal for failure 
to file a timely appeal. The court cited both Taylor v. Hansen, 
342 Utah Adv. Rep. 41, (Utah Ct. App.1998) and Lord v. Lord, 709 
P.2d 338 (Utah 1985) as precedent. Appellant filed a Petition For 
Rehearing and appellee Schriever filed a response. On September 
30, 1998, this Court entered an order denying the Petition For 
Rehearing. Thereafter, Appellant filed a Motion For Reinstatement 
of Appeal. This Court granted appellee Schrieverfs Motion to 
Strike Appellant's Motion For Reinstatement of Appeal holding it to 
be a successive Petition For Rehearing. 
Appellant's petition for certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court 
was granted. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court 
of Appeals and remanded this case back for a review of the merits 
of Appellant's appeal. 
D. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS. 
Appellant's characterizations made as a Statement of Facts are 
incomplete and intentionally misleading. 
His representations in paragraphs 9 and 11, p. 10 of his brief 
are particularly disingenuous. In paragraph 9, Attorney Mabey 
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states: 
9. In December of 1991, Sittner received a check from the 
bankruptcy trustee for $4,033 representing a distribution 
on Sittner's unsecured claim of $36,228 [Rec. 1072 at 1F9, 
Rec.1121]. After Sittner applied the distribution to the 
judgment debt, there still remained a balance owed in 
excess of $30,000 [Sittner Aff. ir5, Rec. 130, 131] . 
Nowhere in the Statement of facts does attorney Mabey disclose 
that on December 14, 1987, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen 
entered a DISCHARGE OF DEBTOR Order releasing appellee Bruce Gildea 
from all personal liability for debts existing on the date of 
commencement of his bankruptcy. 
Appellant's assertion that after Sittner applied the 
distribution to the judgment debt, there still remained a balance 
owed in excess of $30,000 is totally disingenuous and certainly not 
an undisputed fact as Mabey represents. There is no issue of fact. 
Sittner!s judgment debt was fully discharged in GiIdea's 
bankruptcy. See Bankruptcy Trustee Duane H. Gillman affidavit 
[Rec.93,94] stating: 
4. Mr. Sittner, through his attorney L. Benson Mabey, 
entered into a stipulation with me as Trustee, wherein 
Mr. Sittner waived "...any right to assert a secured 
claim in and to any property of this estate or any funds 
which constitute proceeds of property of this estate and 
acknowledges that any and all claim he has is an 
unsecured pre-petition claim." 
5. Mr. Sittner was thereafter paid $4,032.99 as his 
proportionate share of the debtor's estate. Mr. Gildea 
was fully discharged of any further liability under Mr. 
Sittner' s claim. 
Attorney Mabey was not finished attempting to manufacture 
facts more to his liking. In paragraph 11, page 10 of his Brief 
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Mr. Mabey blandly asserts: 
11. The subject property was not sold by the trustee or 
otherwise administered for the benefit of the estate, 
since the trustee had determined that there was not 
sufficient equity available to benefit the estate and he 
intended to abandon the property, but no formal order of 
abandonment was made or entered and so it was deemed 
abandoned to Gildea upon bankruptcy case closing on April 
24, 1992. 
Appellant fails to disclose that the subject property was not 
in fact abandoned to Gildea on April 24, 1992 as he so "deemed." 
Four years and two months earlier, on February 19, 1988, Bankruptcy 
Judge John H. Allen issued an order vacating the Automatic Stay as 
to secured creditor Joy Horsley (Hale) and the subject property 
leaving Mrs. Hale free to foreclose her security interest without 
further order of the court. [Rec. 1113]. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I APPELLANT HAS NO ENFORCEABLE JUDGMENT LIEN. 
A. Sittner's Judgment Lien And Claim Of A Secured Interest 
In Bruce GiIdea's Bankruptcy Estate Was Waived During 
The Course Of Bruce Gildea1s Bankruptcy. 
From the facts of record Judge Wilkinson's Conclusion of Law 
that "Plaintiff Sittner knew, or should have known, that his 
judgment lien and claim of a secured interest in Bruce GiIdea's 
estate was waived during the course of Bruce GiIdea's bankruptcy" 
is inescapable. Sittner signed a stipulation with the bankruptcy 
court stating that he "waives any right to assert a secured claim 
in and to any property of this estate or any funds which constitute 
proceeds of property of this estate and acknowledges that any and 
- 11 -
all claim he has is an unsecured, pre-petition claim." [Rec. 
1119,1120] 
Sittner, through his attorney L. Benson Mabey, filed a PROOF 
OF CLAIM with the United States Bankruptcy Court listing himself as 
an unsecured creditor of Bruce Gildea. [Rec. 1114]. Sittner 
received payment of $4,032.99 as his share of distribution to 
unsecured creditors on his claim of $36,228.73 against appellee 
Gildea. [Rec. 1121] 
The issue of Sittner's waiver of his judgment lien was 
litigated in the Bankruptcy and U.S. District Court and the 
opinions of Bankruptcy Judge John Allen and U.S. District Court 
Judge Tena Campbell should preclude further litigation of the 
matter under the doctrine of "Collateral Estoppel/Issue 
Preclusion." When the facts of this case were submitted to the 
bankruptcy court, Judge John H. Allen reopened Bruce Gildea*s 
bankruptcy case and granted Bruce Gildea1s Motion for Sanctions 
against L. Benson Mabey and John C. Sittner for bringing this 
action. Judge Allen's bench ruling, [Addendum 3] states in part: 
Thus, my conclusion is that the actions of Mr. Sittner in 
this case in filing the proof of claim as an unsecured 
claim, participating in all respects as an unsecured 
creditor and stipulating that he was an unsecured 
creditor with a pre-petition claim had the effect of 
waiving that judgment lien. [Transcript Rec. 1092] 
And the action of bringing an action in the state court 
to set aside a conveyance to other parties and to 
foreclose the lien that had been waived is an action in 
violation of the discharge injunction. There was no 
lien. There was no basis whatsoever for filing the suit 
in the state court. [Rec. 1093]. 
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I find therefore, that Mr. Sittner waived the lien. 
There was no lien after the discharge. The action of 
suing in the state court was a violation of the 
injunction. Sanctions are appropriate against Mr. 
Sittner and counsel Mr. Mabey, who participated in all 
respects in the bankruptcy proceeding and had all the 
knowledge, in fact more knowledge probably than Mr. 
Sittner. [Rec. 1093]. 
On July 16, 1996, U.S. District Judge Tena Campbell ruled the 
Third District Court is competent to make a ruling on the 
dischargeability issue and reversed Judge Allen's order reopening 
Mr. Gildea's bankruptcy. However, as part of her decision Judge 
Campbell ruled: 
"The court finds that the bankruptcy court's evaluation 
of the status of Sittner1s judgment lien is correct in 
all respects. It seems clear that the judgment lien was 
waived in the course of bankruptcy proceedings, and the 
debt secured by that lien was fully discharged in 
bankruptcy". [Order, Rec. 1106, Addendum 5]. 
Judge Campbell's decision was never modified and should be the 
final authority on the matter. Appellant's claim that "The Trial 
Judge Abused His Discretion In Not Granting Sittner's Motion to 
Strike Other Judges' Opinions And In Considering Such Opinions In 
Granting Defendants' Summary Judgment" is hollow indeed. 
Appellant, himself, used Judge Allen's opinion to obtain a stay of 
proceedings in this case to appeal Judge Allen's decision to the 
U.S. District Court. 
The fact that Judge Campbell's opinion is unpublished does not 
preclude its use for precedential value in this case. Rule 4-508, 
Code of Judicial Administration specifically authorizes the use of 
unpublished orders "for purposes of applying the doctrine of the 
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law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel." 
B. A Discharge Of Debt In Bankruptcy Extinguishes 
The Judgment Lien. 
When a judgment debt is satisfied the judgment lien is 
extinguished. Utah Code Ann. 78-22-1 provides that "Judgments 
shall continue for eight years unless the judgment is previously 
satisfied." 
Bruce Gildea*s bankruptcy fully discharged the judgment debt 
asserted by Appellant as the basis for this action, Appellant!s bad 
faith contentions notwithstanding. By Affidavit [Rec. 130-134] 
Sittner asserts that the unpaid balance of the judgment lien after 
crediting all amounts received including the amount received from 
the bankruptcy estate of Bruce Gildea is $90,197.40 together with 
interest accruing at the rate of 20% per annum. 
Judgment liens don!t have unpaid balances. A judgment lien 
is only a means for collecting a valid judgment debt. 
"A judgment lien on land constitutes no property or 
property right in the land itself. It confers only a 
right to levy on the same to the exclusion of other 
adverse interests subsequent to the judgment". Smith v, 
Schwartz, 60 P.305, 309 (Utah 1899) 
In Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938, 939 (Utah 1988), the 
High Court ruled that Utah's "statutory scheme has no provision for 
the extension of a judgment lien independent of the judgement on 
which it is based". The Court in concluding that a discharge of 
judgment in bankruptcy precludes enforcement of a judgment lien 
even if the judgment lien was not avoided in bankruptcy stated as 
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follows: 
[1] Appellant contends that since the judgment lien was 
not avoided in bankruptcy proceeding, it is renewable and 
the judgment should be renewed in some limited form to 
support the lien without reviving respondents' personal 
liability. This theory finds no support in our 
statutory scheme. A judgment lien is purely a creation 
of statute. It does not exist in common law; therefore, 
the rights of the parties must be determined within the 
statutory framework. 
Accordingly, Sittner's judgment lien was voided when appellee 
Bruce Gildea obtained a discharge of indebtedness from the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the State of Utah on December 14, 1987. 
C. Appellant Is Estopped To Assert A Judgment Lien. 
Appellant Sittner, through his attorney L. Benson Mabey, filed 
a PROOF OF CLAIM with the United States Bankruptcy Court listing 
himself as an unsecured creditor of appellee Bruce Gildea. 
Sittner received payment of $4,032.99 as his share of distribution 
to unsecured creditors on his claim of $36,228.73 against appellee 
Gildea. In order to participate as an unsecured creditor Sittner 
entered into a Stipulation with Trustee Gillman as follows: 
"1. ... John C. Sittner, waives any right to assert a 
secured claim in and to any property of this estate or 
any funds which constitute proceeds of property of this 
estate and acknowledges that any and all claim he has is 
an unsecured, pre-petition claim." [Rec.1119]. 
The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel bars a litigant who has 
taken a position in prior litigation and has obtained relief on the 
basis of that position from maintaining the opposite position in a 
subsequent action. See Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 
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1980) and Roy S. Ludlow Investment Co. v. Salt Lake County, 551 
P.2d 1259 (Utah 1976). A party is bound by his judicial 
declarations and may not contradict them in a subsequent proceeding 
involving the same parties and issues. See Sailes v.Jones, 499 
P.2d 721 and Adams v. Bear, 350 P.2d 751. 
Plaintiff Sittner is estopped by his prior actions. He can't 
have it both ways. He can't waive any right he may have to assert 
a secured claim in the bankruptcy court in order to receive payment 
as an unsecured creditor and thereafter assert that he is a secured 
creditor in the state courts and that his judgment lien was not 
avoided by the bankruptcy proceeding initiated for the very purpose 
of avoiding his lien. 
D. The Statutory Period For Foreclosing Sittner!s 
Judgment Lien Expired, Notwithstanding Any Tolling 
Period That Could Have Been Caused By Bruce GiIdea's 
Bankruptcy. 
Even if the claimed judgment lien had somehow survived lien 
waiver and satisfaction of judgment in the bankruptcy court, 
enforcement of the lien was barred by expiration of the limitation 
period for enforcing judgment liens. Utah Code Ann. 78-22-1(1) 
provides: 
Judgments shall continue for eight years unless previously 
satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed in 
accordance with law. 
Sittnerfs judgement was docketed November 25, 1985 and would 
expire November 25, 1993 unless "enforcement of the judgment is 
stayed in accordance with law." Appellant argues that under the 
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Bankruptcy Code §108(c), the limitation period was suspended for 
more than six years by the automatic stay and such period is tacked 
on to the normal expiration date in November of 1993. Mabey 
asserts that Sittner's judgment was enforceable until the end of 
1999 by operation of the federal law. 
Mabey fails to inform the court that the automatic stay was 
not in effect until April 24, 1992 as he represents to this court. 
On February 19, 1988, Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen issued an 
order vacating the Automatic Stay as to secured creditor Joy 
Horsley (Hale) and the subject property leaving Mrs. Hale free to 
foreclose her security interest without further order of the court. 
[Rec. 1113]. 
Factoring the truth into the equation, it can only be said 
that the automatic stay was in effect from January 16, 1986 when 
Gildea!s bankruptcy was filed until February 19, 1988 when the stay 
was lifted, a period of two years and 33 days. If one adds two 
years and thirty three days to November 25, 1993 the expiration 
date for enforcing the lien would be extended to December 28, 1995. 
This court should bear in mind that Appellant was under a self 
imposed stay of proceedings on December 28, 1995. On October 10, 
1995 Sittner sought and obtained an order from Judge Wilkinson 
staying further proceedings in this case pending review of the 
bankruptcy order by the U.S. District Court. [Rec. 939-941]. 
On October 23, 1996, more than eight years and eight months 
after the Automatic Stay had been lifted by the bankruptcy court, 
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Sittner resumed efforts to foreclose his claimed judgment lien by 
filing a Motion For An Order Compelling Discovery. He asked the 
court to allow him to take the depositions of appellees Hale (then 
on an LDS Mission) and Schriever (a resident of Maryland) by 
telephone. [Rec. 946]. 
Thereafter, on January 14, 1997 appellee Schriever filed her 
Third Motion For Summary Judgment. [Rec. 1061]. On March 25, 
1997, Judge Wilkinson granted Schriever's Third Motion For Summary 
Judgment dismissing appellant Sittnerfs complaint with prejudice 
and awarding all appellee/defendants costs and attorneys fees 
pursuant to Utah Code annotated 78-27-56. [Rec. 1257, Copy, 
Addendum 1]. 
Even if this Court accepts Appellant's argument that the eight 
year limitation for foreclosing a lien should be extended by the 
time the property was shielded by the automatic stay it is of no 
benefit to Appellant. The trial court's entry of Summary Judgment 
dismissing Appellant's action did not occur until fifteen months 
after the two year and 33 day extension would have expired. 
In Smith v. Schwartz, 60 P.305, (Utah 1899) the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled that the lien of a judgment expires at the end of the 
statutory period established by the legislature and the courts are 
powerless to extend it beyond that time - even though the judgment 
creditor was wrongfully enjoined from levying execution upon the 
property until after his lien expired. 
It matters not that Plaintiff Sittner!s alleged lien expired 
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during the pendency of this action. In Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. 
v. Walker, 115 Utah 461, 206 P.2d 146 (Utah 1949) the trial court's 
entry of a judgment foreclosing a lien which had expired during the 
pendency of the foreclosure action was reversed citing Smith v. 
Schwartz. 
Point II APPELLANT FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE 
UTAH UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT. 
A. There Was No Transfer Of GiIdea's Interest. 
Upon purchase of the vendor's interest in the subject 
property appellee Schriever assumed Mrs. Hale's position as 
contract seller to the GiIdeas. The transaction involved no 
conveyance or modification of Mr. Gildea's interest in the subject 
property. The Gildeas retain a vendees' interest under the 
installment purchase contract and continue to occupy the subject 
property as their family residence. 
Appellant, asserts that appellee Joy Hale's sale of her 
vendor's interest in an installment land contract to appellee 
Schriever "constituted fraudulent transfers . . . under the Utah 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-1 et seq." 
Plaintiff's complaint cites no specifics in support of this 
allegation other than to note that appellee Schriever is appellee 
Shirlynn GiIdea's sister and to allege that appellee Bruce Gildea 
"directed" appellee Hale to transfer the property to appellee 
Schriever. Assuming all of Appellant's allegations to be true. 
Appellant's complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which 
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relief may be granted. 
Appellant fails to note which section of the Utah Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act he relies upon. Utah Code Ann. 25-6-5 
and 25-6-6 appear to be the operative provisions of the act but 
each require a "debtor" and a "creditor" and a "transfer" by a 
"debtor" with the "actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud a 
creditor of the debtor" or a transfer made "without receiving a 
reasonably equivalent value in exchange" when the "debtor was 
insolvent at the time" or rendered insolvent by the transfer. 
Appellant Sittner is unable to allege any of the above. He 
has no standing to bring an action under any portion of this 
statute. He is not a creditor of any named defendant. His 
judgment and judgment lien were satisfied and extinguished in Bruce 
GiIdea's bankruptcy. Alleged debtor, Bruce Gildea made no 
transfer of any of his assets and was not rendered insolvent by 
Schriever's purchase of Halefs vendor's interest in the subject 
installment land contract. Appellee Schriever is a bona fide 
purchaser who paid valuable consideration and acted in good faith, 
without notice or knowledge of adverse claims and with no intent to 
defraud. 
Sittner asked the trial court to "impress" the subject realty 
with a judgment lien "as a valid and subsisting first lien against 
a one-half undivided interest in the subject property". Even if 
Sittnerfs judgment lien had somehow survived Bruce GiIdea's 
bankruptcy it could not supersede appellee Hale's interest in the 
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property. A vendor's secured interest in an installment land 
contract protects the vendor's property from appropriation by 
creditors of the vendee* If such were not the case installment 
sales would not be a commercially viable alternative for selling 
land. 
Joy Hale's title to the subject property was in no way 
impaired by Bruce Gildea's bankruptcy. She was a secured 
creditor. Her security was the title to the property. 
The Gildea's owed Ms. Hale much more than the property was 
worth. The contract was seriously in default and amortizing 
negatively. The Trustee in Bankruptcy found it to be of no value 
to Mr. Gildea's bankruptcy estate. Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen 
issued an order vacating the Automatic Stay as to appellee Joy 
Horsley (Hale) and the subject property leaving her free to dispose 
of her interest in the property as she pleased. [Rec. 1113]. 
Although free of the Automatic Stay in February of 1988, 
Sittner brought no adversary proceeding seeking to value the 
subject real estate contract or assert a judgement lien interest in 
the property while the Gildea bankruptcy was before the Bankruptcy 
Court. 
B. An Action For Declaratory Relief Should Be 
Brought As A Separate Action. 
Appellant contends that he should not be liable for attorneys 
fees for litigating an action which the trial court found to be 
without merit and brought in bad faith simply because he asserts 
the action is "commenced" under the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act, 
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Utah Code Ann. §78-33-1. This defense is indicative of the bad 
faith exhibited throughout this litigation. 
The complaint alleges the conveyance from Hale to Schriever 
"constituted fraudulent transfers or arrangements under the "Utah 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 26-6-1 et seq." 
and that the Warranty Deed from Hale to Schriever was issued "with 
actual intent to hinder, delay or defeat" the judgment lien claimed 
by appellant Sittner. Sittner asked the trial court to "impress" 
the subject realty with a judgment lien "as a valid and subsisting 
first lien against a one-half undivided interest in the subject 
property" and to have the subject property sold at execution sale 
to satisfy Sittner!s Judgment." [Complaint, Rec. 6,7,8] 
By affidavit, Sittner asserted the "judgment lien" had an 
"unpaid balance" of $90,197.40 with interest accruing at the rate 
of 20% per annum. [Sittner Affidavit, Rec. 130-134]. Nowhere in 
the pleadings did Sittner acknowledge that his judgment had been 
fully discharged in Bruce Gildea's bankruptcy action. 
Sittner sued Hale and Schriever even though he had never been 
a creditor of either. Mabey filed a lis pendens against 
Schrieverfs property and filed two motions for Summary Judgment 
asking the court to allow execution and sale of the property all 
without a final determination that Sittner had a valid lien against 
the property and that there had been a fraudulent transfer by 
debtor Gildea. 
An action for declaratory judgment should be a separate action 
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from an effort to impress a lien and foreclose and sell a property. 
Baldwin v. Burton 850 P.2d 1188, 1199 (Utah 1993) holds that before 
any relief is available under the Fraudulent Transfer Act there 
must first be a separate action to determine if there has been a 
fraudulent transfer. The remedy provided by the Fraudulent 
Transfer Act is the voiding of the conveyance. 
Of particular relevance to this litigation is the Supreme 
Court's conclusion in Baldwin that: 
Had the Burtons proceeded with an honest belief in the 
propriety of their activities they would have sought 
first to have the Wood to Wood conveyance set aside as 
fraudulent before attempting to wrongfully execute on 
Baldwin's interest in the property. Accordingly, we 
hold that Baldwin is entitled to an award of attorney 
fees under section 78-27-56. 
Point III. APPELLEES ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES FOR DEFENDING 
A FRIVOLOUS LAW SUIT AND A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL. 
A. Appellant's Action Is Without Merit And In Bad Faith. 
The problem of frivolous lawsuits is plaguing our legal 
system. In 1988 the Utah legislature amended section U.C.A. 78-27-
56. The amendment makes the award of attorney's fee mandatory when 
a frivolous action is initiated. The legislature promulgated the 
Amendment with the hope that the courts will award attorney's fees 
more aggressively so that practitioners will refrain from filing 
actions which are frivolous. 
Baldwin v. Burton 850 P.2d 1188, 1199 (Utah 1993) provides a 
recent interpretation of the amended statute. The Court stated: 
For a party to be entitled to attorney fees under section 
78-27-56, the trial court must determine that a claim is 
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"without merit" and that the party's conduct in bringing the suit 
was "lacking in good faith." In Cady, we defined both of these 
elements, stating that "without merit" means "frivolous" or "having 
no basis in law or fact." For purposes of section 78-27-56, we 
found the terms "lack of good faith" and "bad faith" to be 
synonymous. To establish bad faith, one or more of the following 
must be lacking: "(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the 
activities in question; (2) no intent to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; (3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact 
that the activities in question will [sic] hinder, delay or defraud 
others." 
Judge Wilkinson entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law detailing the basis for his award of attorney fees. [Rec. 1250-
1255, Addendum 2]. He concluded that "Plaintiff's claims are 
without merit and not asserted in good faith." To establish both 
lack of merit and bad faith, Judge Wilkinson's Conclusions of Law 
state: 
1. Plaintiff Sittner knew, or should have known, that his 
judgment lien and claim of a secured interest in Bruce 
GiIdea's estate was waived during the course of Bruce 
GiIdea's bankruptcy. Mr. Sittner stipulated to avoidance 
of the judgment lien in order to participate in the 
distribution to unsecured creditors. 
2. Plaintiff is not a creditor of any named defendant 
and has no basis in law to contest any transfer of 
property by any of them. Plaintiff had no grounds for 
suing defendants Hale and Schriever for fraudulent 
transfer of property. 
Judge Wilkinson's conclusions are supported by sixteen 
specific Findings of Fact. 
Appellant protests the trial court's entry of Summary Judgment 
claiming there are issues of material fact which are unresolved but 
his Brief does not say what they are. This court should bear in 
mind that Appellant on two different occasions filed his own 
motions for summary judgement in effect alleging there are no 
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issues of material fact. Appellant failed to raise any relevant 
factual issues during the trial court's consideration of the cross-
motions for summary judgment. All matters in dispute were 
questions of law. 
Appellant filed no motion pursuant to Rules 50(a) and (b), 
52(b), 54(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure contesting the 
trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made in 
support of its award of attorney fees. 
B. Appellees Should Be Awarded Just Damages For Frivolous 
Appeal. 
Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides for an 
award of just damages for frivolous appeal and delay including 
single or double costs and reasonable attorney fees against 
Appellant and/or Appellant's attorney, L. Benson Mabey. 
An appeal brought from an action that was properly determined 
to be in bad faith is necessarily frivolous under Rule 33(a). Utah 
Dep't of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P. 2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Attorney Mabey has played fast and loose with pleadings 
throughout this case. He continues to misrepresent this action as 
brought under the "Utah Declaratory Judgments Act" when in fact he 
sued appellees under the Utah Fraudulent Transfers Act requesting 
foreclosure and sale of the subject property. 
Mabeyfs penchant for misrepresentation and distortion of fact 
and law is clearly manifested in the Brief filed with this court. 
His mischaracterization of facts and law include; (1) a refusal to 
acknowledge that Gildea's debt was fully discharged in bankruptcy, 
(2) a refusal to admit that the bankruptcy automatic stay relating 
to the subject property was in effect for no more than two years 
and thirty three days, not six years as he alleges and (3) a 
refusal to acknowledge that the life of judgment liens is governed 
by state law not federal law. 
Mr. Mabeyfs ego is clearly bruised. He simply cannot accept 
the fact that he is not as clever as he fashions himself. His 
effort to outsmart, (1) the bankruptcy court; (2) the trial court; 
(3) the Supreme Court, and now the Court of Appeals is the root of 
his problems. 
This appeal was filed for purposes of delay and not filed 
pursuant to a good faith belief in the merits of the appeal. Both 
Appellant Sittner and Attorney Mabey should be ordered to re-
imburse appellees for the cost of exposing the charade surrounding 
this frivolous litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's Summary Judgment dismissing Appellant's 
complaint and its Supplemental Judgment awarding appellees attorney 
fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56 should be affirmed. 
This Court should award Appellees attorneys fees and costs on 
appeal pursuant Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and 
remand the case for the limited purpose of determining those 
- 26 -
amounts. 
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Grant W. P. Morrison 3666 
Morrison & Morrison, L.C. 
352 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-7999 
Facsimile: (801) 359-1774 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FUD DISTRICT COURT 
^ r d Judicial District 
MAR 2 5 1997 
' SAH; LAKE COUNTY 
JOHN C. SITTNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE 
OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER 
FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA 




Civil No. 930904459cv 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The above entitled matter came on for hearing on defendant 
Karen H. Schriever's Third Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants 
Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea's Motion to Reinstate Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered August 15, 1995, and on 
plaintiff John C. Sittner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, on 
the 25th day of February, 1997, at the hour of 8:00 a.m., before 
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson in Room 502, Courts Building, 240 
East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. L. Benson Mabey appeared as 
counsel for plaintiff John C. Sittner. William D. Marsh appeared as 
counsel for Defendant karen H. Schriever. Grant W. P. Morrison 
appeared as counsel for Defendants Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea, and 
Randall E. Grant appeared as counsel for Defendant Joy Hale. The 
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court having heard and considered oral arguments of counsel and 
having read and considered the pleadings, affidavits, memoranda of 
authority, exhibits and all other documents on file in this action 
and being fully apprised in the premises and having read into the 
record the basis for its opinion, and having entered its FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and good cause appearing, NOW 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES: 
1. Plaintiff's complaint against all named defendants herein 
is hereby dismissed on its merits and with prejudice. 
2. Plaintiff's complaint against all named defendants herein 
is barred by the statute of limitations. 
3. Defendants are herewith awarded their costs and reasonable 
attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56. The amounts of 
attorney fees is preserved for later determination by this Court 
and are to be limited to proceedings in this case and are not to 
include any fees incurred in other actions before the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court or U.S. District Court. 
DATED this s^ ^ day of ^  ^ ^ > ^ * 0 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
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Addendum 2 
Grant W. P. Morrison 3666 
Morrison & Morrison, L.C. 
352 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-7999 
Facsimile: (801) 359-1774 
FiLf D DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial Disiric' 
MAR 2 5 1997 
-SfhT LAKE COUNTY 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT ^ 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN C. SITTNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE 
OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER 
FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA 
SHIRLYNN GILDEA and JOY 
HALE, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 930904459cv 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The above entitled matter came on for hearing on defendant 
Karen H. Schriever's Third Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants 
Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea's Motion to Reinstate Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered August 15, 1995, and on 
plaintiff John C. Sittner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, on 
the 25th day of February, 1997, at the hour of 8:00 a.m., before 
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson in Room 502, Courts Building, 240 
East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. L. Benson Mabey appeared as 
counsel for plaintiff John C. Sittner. William D. Marsh appeared as 
counsel for Defendant karen H. Schriever. Grant W. P. Morrison 
appeared as counsel for Defendants Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea, and 
Randall E. Grant appeared as counsel for Defendant Joy Hale. The 
court having heard and considered oral arguments of counsel and 
having read and considered the pleadings, affidavits, memoranda of 
authority, exhibits and all other documents on file in this action 
and being fully apprised in the premises and having read into the 
record the basis for its opinion, and good cause appearing, DOES 
HEREBY MAKE AND ENTER THE FOLLOWING: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about February 20, 1981, Defendant Joy Hale, as 
seller, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Defendants 
Bruce Gildea and shirlynn Gildea, as buyers. Under the terms of the 
contract Ms. Hale agreed to sell and the Gildeas agreed to buy a 
house and lot located in Salt Lake County at 2400 East 3000 South. 
2. On November 25, 1985, Plaintiff John C. Sittner obtained 
judgment against Defendant Bruce Gildea and others in the amount of 
$30,598.35 together with an award of costs, attorney's fees of 
$3,250.00 and interest at the rate of 20% per annum. 
3. In January of 1986 Defendant Bruce Gildea, filed 
banlcruptcy proceedings in the Untied States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Utah. 
4. Plaintiff Sittner and his attorney L. Benson Mabey filed 
a claim with the United States Bankruptcy Court as unsecured 
creditors based upon Sittner's judgment. 
5. During the course of Defendant Bruce Gildeafs bankruptcy, 
Bankruptcy Trustee, Duane H. Gillman, filed an Adversarial 
Complaint, under Section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, to avoid 
the judgment lien asserted by Plaintiff Sittner alleging the same 
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constituted a preferential transfer in violation of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Plaintiff through his attorney L. Benson Mabey thereupon 
entered into a stipulation with Trustee Gillman agreeing to the 
following terms: 
"1. The Defendant, John C. Sittner, waives 
any right to assert a secured claim in and to 
any property of this estate or any funds which 
constitute proceeds of property of this estate 
and acknowledges that any and all claim he has 
is an unsecured, pre-petition claim. 
Defendants rights respecting property 
abandoned by the estate or not administered by 
closing are preserved and unaffected hereby." 
6. Plaintiff John C. Sittner thereupon secured payment of 
$4,302.99 from Trustee Gillman as Sittner's share of distribution 
to unsecured creditors on his claim of $36,228.73. 
7. On December 14, 1987, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen 
entered a DISCHARGE OF DEBTOR Order discharging Defendant Bruce 
Gildea from all personal liability under Plaintiff Sittner#s 
judgment. 
8. On February 19, 1988 Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen issued 
an order vacating the Automatic Stay as to secured creditor Joy 
Horsley (Hale) and the subject property. 
9. In January of 1992, Defendant Joy Hale sold her interest 
in the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract to Defendant karen H. 
Schriever for the unpaid balance of the contract as discounted for 
cash. 
10. On August 3, 1992 Defendant Hale Conveyed and Warranted 
clear title to the property to Karen H. Schriever, Trustee of the 
Karen H. Schriever Family Trust, dated July 20, 1992. Upon purchase 
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of the vendor's interest in the subject property Defendant 
Schriever assumed Mrs, Hale's position as contract seller to the 
Gildeas. 
11. On June 28, 1993 Plaintiff Sittner brought action to 
impress the subject realty with a judgment lien "as a valid and 
subsisting first lien against a one-half undivided interest in the 
subject property", asserting said judgment lien had an "unpaid 
balance" of $90,197.40 with interest accruing at the rate of 20% 
per annum. 
12. In a companion cause of action Plaintiff Sittner alleged 
that Defendant Schriever's purchase, from Defendant Hale, of the 
vendor interest in the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract 
"constituted fraudulent transfers or arrangements under the Utah 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 25-6-1 et 
seq" and that the Warranty Deed from Hale to Schriever was issued 
"with actual intent to hinder, delay or defeat" the judgment lien 
claimed by Plaintiff Sittner. 
13. There has been no conveyance of any sort by Defendant 
Bruce Gildea, of his one half interest in the subject property. The 
Gildeas retain a vendee's interest under the installment purchase 
contract and continue to occupy the subject property as their 
family residence. 
14. Defendant Bruce Gildea is not insolvent and he has no 
indebtedness to Plaintiff John C. Sittner. 
15. Plaintiff Sittner's judgment was entered November 25, 
1985. Enforcement of the judgment has at no time been stayed by/on 
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appeal and no action to renew the judgment has been undertaken. 
16. The eight (8) year statutory period for foreclosing 
Plaintiff's judgment lien has expired, notwithstanding any tolling 
periods that could have been caused by Bruce Gildea's bankruptcy. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff Sittner knew, or should have known, that his 
judgment lien and claim of a secured interest in Bruce Gildea's 
estate was waived during the course of Bruce Gildea's bankruptcy. 
Mr. Sittner stipulated to avoidance of the judgment lien in order 
to participate in the distribution to unsecured creditors. 
2. Plaintiff is not a creditor of any named defendant and has 
no basis in law to contest any transfer of property by any of them. 
Plaintiff had no grounds for suing defendants Hale and Schriever 
for fraudulent transfer of property. 
3. Had the claimed judgment lien survived the Gildea 
bankruptcy, enforcement of the lien would have been barred by the 
statute of limitations for foreclosing judgment liens. 
4. Plaintiff's claims are without merit and not asserted in 
good faith. 
5. There are no genuine issues of material fact and 
defendants are entitled to-judgment as a matter of law. 
6. Defendant Karen H. Schriever's Third Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be, and is hereby, granted. Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment should be, and is hereby, denied. All 
other motions pending before the court, including motions to take 
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depositions and compel further discovery, are rendered moot. 
7. Judgment should be granted against Plaintiff dismissing 
this action with prejudice and awarding all defendants reasonable 
attorney fees incurred in the defense of this action as provided 
under Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56, as amended. Attorney's fees are to 
be limited to proceedings in this case and are not to include any 
fees incurred in other actions before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court or 
U.S. District Court. 
DATED this ^ >^ day of ^? <^^^A 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 




IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
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In re: ) 
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Alpha Court Reporting Service 
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Telephone (801)532-5645 
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Reported By: Karen Murakami, CSR, RPR 
File No. 512-95K 
1 Salt Lake City, Utah, Friday, May 12, 1995, 9:00 a.m. 
2 * * • 
3 THE COURT: There is no question in my mind but 
4 what the law is that generally in a bankruptcy case a lien 
5 survives the bankruptcy case if there has been no action in 
6 the case contrary to that. I believe also that when a 
7 claimant files a secured claim in a bankruptcy case, the 
8 claimant is telling the creditors and the court and the 
9 debtor that the claimant intends to rely upon that security 
10 and will not participate in any dividends that are developed 
11 for unsecured creditors. By the same token when a claimant 
12 files an unsecured claim, the claimant is telling the 
13 creditors and the court and the debtor that the claimant 
14 claims nothing, and if that claimant has a lien the claimant 
15 is waiving that lien and intends to pursue that claimant's 
16 pro rata share of dividends collected for unsecured 
17 creditors. 
18 In this case, the Court finds that the claimant, 
19 John C. Sittner, did file a proof of claim in the amount of 
20 $36,228.73 and the claim designated that claim as an 
21 unsecured claim. The claim did recite that it was based on a 
22 judgment. But I think that fact alone is evidence of waiver 
23 of the claim, and that is consistent with the testimony of 
24 Mr. Mabey here today, that he felt there was no equity in the 
25 property at the time and there would be nothing gained from 
1 pursuing the secured claim. Normally that would be all the 
2 evidence there would be and I think I could find or would 
3 find that the secured claim or the lien is waived based upon 
4 the proof of claim only. 
5 In this case, there are other documents and other 
6 circumstances. The stipulation entered into between Mr. 
7 Sittner and the Bankruptcy Trustee recites that, among other 
8 things, it acknowledges that any and all claim he has, he 
9 Sittner, is an unsecured prepetition claim. In addition to 
10 that, Mr. Sittner participated and received dividends as an 
11 unsecured creditor, thus depriving other creditors of a 
12 larger distribution, if there were some equity to be claimed 
13 in the secured claim. 
14 Thus, my conclusion is that the actions of Mr. 
15 Sittner in this case in filing the proof of claim as an 
16 unsecured claim, participating in all respects as an 
17 unsecured creditor and stipulating that he was an unsecured 
18 creditor with a prepetition claim had the effect of waiving 
19 that judgment lien. The judgment lien wasn't set aside by 
20 any order of this Court, but I think the conclusion is that 
21 it was waived is proper. 
22 The next thing I have to find is whether there has 
23 I been a violation of the injunction, that's the discharge 
24 | injunction. The discharge was entered on December 14, 19 87 
25 | That discharge enjoined all creditors and other parties from 
attempting to collect any debt that has been discharged. The 
2 I unsecured debt represented by the proof of claim was 
3 discharged. And the action of bringing an action in the 
4 state court to set aside a conveyance to other parties and to 
5 foreclose the lien that had been waived is an action in 
6 violation of the discharge injunction. There was no lien. 
7 There was no basis whatsoever for filing the suit in the 
8 state court. 
9 I find, therefore, that Mr. Sittner waived the 
10 lien. There was no lien after the discharge. The action of 
11 suing in the state court was a violation of the injunction. 
12 Sanctions are appropriate against both Mr. Sittner and 
13 counsel Mr. Mabey, who participated in all respects in the 
14 bankruptcy proceeding and had all the knowledge, in fact more 
15 knowledge probably than Mr. Sittner. 
16 The question I have is whether this was a willful 
17 violation justifying anything other than actual damages. Mr. 
18 Sittner didn't testify, so the Court has no way of knowing 
19 what he knew and why the case was filed or anything about his 
2 0 financial ability to respond to sanctions. And I can't tell 
21 from Mr. Mabey1s testimony whether there was or was not any 
22 knowledge that this was, in fact, a violation of the 
23 discharge injunction. 
24 My observations too are that the debtor could have 
25 come to this Court to receive a determination of a violation 
1 of this injunction far earlier than he did. There's been a 
2 lot of litigation in the state court, and I'm not faulting 
3 the state court for that, but to get a determination of the 
4 violation of a discharge injunction, this is the Court that 
5 must make that determination. 
6 And so my conclusion is that perhaps all of those 
7 attorney's fees would not have been spent had the parties 
2 ! come to this Court before- But en the ether hand, creditors 
9 and counsel should be encouraged to avoid violation of the 
10 discharge injunction, violation of their own position taken 
11 in the bankruptcy court and that position is that they're 
12 unsecured. 
13 I believe, therefore, that the violations were 
14 willful, not malicious but willful in the sense that they 
15 were knowing, knowing that the discharge injunction was there 
16 and knowing or should have known knowing that the law 
17 prohibited these actions. 
18 With all that in mind, I don't think that sanctions 
19 justify $25,000. I think the only thing that is justified 
20 under the circumstances is reimbursement of the attorney's 
21 fees, which I'm going to fix in the amount of $8,000. So 
22 those are the sanctions that will be awarded against Mr. 
23 Sittner and Mr. Mabey, and that's the extent. 
24 Mr. Morrison, would you prepare an order. You need 
25 not make all of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
1 since they have been made on the record, but you can prepare 
2 the order concerning the sanctions. 
3 MR. MORRISON: Point of clarification, that was a 
4 total of $8,000. 
5 THE COURT: Total. 
6 MR. MORRISON: I've got it. Thank you, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: If there are no questions then, Court 
8 will be in recess. 
9 (Whereupon, the matter was concluded.) 
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JBt W. P. Morris #3666 Drney at Law 5 East 3300 South $blt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 485-7999. 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
JL'H 8 K 03 Pi'i '35 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
\V;L 
IN RE: 
BRUCE L. GILDEA, 
Debtor. 
Bankruptcy No. 86A-00168 
(Chapter 7) 
ORDER 
Judge: John H, Allen 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on debtor's Motion 
for Sanctions for Violating Bankruptcy Discharge and for Finding 
that Claim of John C. Sittner was Unsecured and Discharged and for 
Attorney's Fees, on the 12th day of May, 1995, and Grant W, P. 
Morrison appearing for debtor and L. Benson Mabey appearing for 
John C. Sittner, and testimony having been taken and 
exhibits admitted, and argument have been heard, and the Court 
having read Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law into the 
record, the Court, for good cause appearing, hereby ORDERS, 
ADJUDGES AND DECREES, 
1. The actions of John C, Sittner in this case in filing the 
proof of claim as an unsecured claim, participating in all respects 
as an unsecured creditor and stipulating that he was an unsecured 
creditor with a prepetition claim had the effect of waiving the 
pigment lien agai the property of debtor ted at 2400 East 
/000 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109, and it is so ordered. 
2. Debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy was discharged December 14, 
1987, and that discharge enjoined all creditors and other parties 
from attempting to collect any debt that has been discharged. The 
action of John C. Sittner of suing in state court was a violation 
of the injunction, which is still in effect, and sanctions are 
appropriate against both John C. Sittner and his counsel L. Benson 
Mabey, for violation of the continuing injunction, in the amount of 
Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00), jointly and severally. 
DATED this /,^day of ^<^<:— , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
s,// ^,9^ 
John H. Allen 
U. S. Bankruptcy Judge 
^ i r r ^ e n s o n Mabey 
Attorney for 
John c. Sittner 
, r ^ -by certity that the annexed and ior$got% 
is a true and compete copy of a document on 
file in the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the District of Utah. 
Dated: \ ) | | i * | 
Attest: 
Addendum 5 
pi? r n 
i 0 WJL - J .»«il l I ^ 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRJ^T OTOTAH (^ 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
JOHN C. SITTNER, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
BRUCE L. GILDEA, 
Appellee. 
This case is an appeal from the bankruptcy court's order dated June 14, 1995, which found 
that appellant Sinner's judgment lien on property owned by the debtor, appellee Gildea, was 
waived by Sittner in the course of Gildea's bankruptcy proceeding, and that Gildea's discharge 
order on December 14, 1987, enjoined all creditors, including Sittner, from suing to recover debts 
which had been discharged. The bankruptcy court found that Sittner and his counsel L. Benson 
Mabey had violated the discharge injunction by filing an action in state court on the judgment lien 
which had been waived. The bankruptcy court imposed sanctions of $8,000.00 as 
"reimbursement of the attorney's fees" against Sittner and Mabey. 
The court finds that the bankruptcy court's evaluation of the status of Sittner's judgment 
lien is correct in all respects. It seems clear that the judgment lien was waived in the course of the 
bankruptcy proceedings, and that the debt secured by that lien was fully discharged in bankruptcy. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 2:< 
However, the issue of the dischargeability of this debt was properly presented to the state 
tcum first, and the state court had jurisdiction to rule on this issue. In the state court action, 
Gildea raised the bankruptcy discharge as a defense, and the state court found that the lien had 
survived Gildea's bankruptcy and the debt was not subject to the discharge order. It was only 
after the state court had made this adverse ruling1 that Gildea went to the bankruptcy court to 
seek another ruling on the same issue. The issue of whether a debt has been discharged in 
bankruptcy can be decided either in state court or bankruptcy court, both courts having 
concurrent jurisdiction over such issues. See In re Carter. 156 B.R. 768 (E. D. Va. 1993); In re 
Brice. 79 B.R. 310 (S. D. Ohio 1987). The state court was therefore competent to make a ruling 
on the dischargeability issue, and the state court's ruling stands unless reconsidered or overturned 
on appeal. As in In re Coppi. 75 B.R. 81, 82 (S.D. Iowa 1987), appellee is simply attempting to 
"relitigate the issue of dischargeability and effectively overturn the state court ruling in a 
bankruptcy forum." Such grounds are insufficient to justify reopening the bankruptcy case, and 
the reopening of this case was an abuse of discretion. Although in this case the state court is 
apparently willing to follow the bankruptcy court's lead in deciding the dischargeability issue,2 the 
issue has been properly presented to that court, and it is improper for the federal court to make a 
ruling on an issue which has been fully litigated in state court. 
1
 The state court originally ruled in favor of Gildea on the dischargeability issue, deciding 
that the lien had not survived the bankruptcy action and that Sittner's action should be dismissed. 
Sittner requested that the court reconsider its ruling, and the court then ruled that the lien was 
valid, and entered judgment for Sittner. 
2
 Following the bankruptcy court's order finding that the debt was discharged, the state 
court reconsidered its ruling again, and on August 15, 1995, entered an order dismissing Sittner's 
claim based on the bankruptcy court's findings. 
Accordingly, the bankruptcy court's order reopening this case and imposing sanctions3 is 
hereby reversed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this |lp day of July, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
-* t ^ /S^A 
TENA CAMPBELL 
United States District Judge 
3
 Although this court does not disagree with the bankruptcy court's finding that appellant's 
violation of the discharge order was "willful," an award of attorney fees, such as the bankruptcy 
court made in this case, is available as a sanction in the state court proceeding. The court notes 
that, in fact, the state court's August 15, 1995 order awards appellee attorney fees. 
